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ABSTRACT 
In identity management system, commonly used biometric recognition system needs attention towards 
issue of biometric template protection as far as more reliable solution is concerned. In view of this 
biometric template protection algorithm should satisfy security, discriminability and cancelability. As no 
single template protection method is capable of satisfying the basic requirements, a novel technique for 
face template generation and protection is proposed. The novel approach is proposed to provide security 
and accuracy in new user enrollment as well as authentication process. This novel technique takes 
advantage of both the hybrid approach and the binary discriminant analysis algorithm. This algorithm is 
designed on the basis of random projection, binary discriminant analysis and fuzzy commitment scheme. 
Three publicly available benchmark face databases are used for evaluation. The proposed novel 
technique enhances the discriminability and recognition accuracy by 80% in terms of matching score of 
the face images and provides high security. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Biometric systems are being deployed in various applications including travel and 
transportation, financial institutions, health care, law enforcement agencies and border crossing, 
thus enhancing security and discriminability of biometric template. The human face is a feature 
that can be used by biometric systems. Human face recognition by analyzing the size and 
position of different facial features is being pushed for use at several airports to increase 
security. In spite of many advantages, biometric systems like any other security applications are 
vulnerable to a wide range of attacks. An attack on a biometric system can take place for three 
main reasons: 
A person may wish to disguise his own identity. For instance, an individual/terrorist attempting 
to enter a country without legal permission may try to modify his biometric trait or conceal it by 
placing an artificial biometric trait (e.g. a synthetic fingerprint, mask, or contact lens) over his 
biometric trait. Recently, in January 2009, the Japanese border control fingerprint system was 
deceived by a woman who used tape-made artificial fingerprints on her true fingerprints. 
An attack on a biometric system can occur because an individual wants to attain privileges that 
another person has. The impostor, in this case, may forge biometric trait of genuine user in order 
to gain the unauthorized access to systems such as person's bank account or to gain physical 
access to a restricted region. 
A benefit to sharing biometric trait may be the cause to attack the biometric systems. Someone, 
for instance, can establish a new identity during enrollment using a synthetically generated 
biometric trait. Thus, sharing the artificial biometric trait leads to sharing that fraudulent identity 
with multiple people. To enhance the recognition performance as well as to provide the better 
security, new system is to be proposed. The proposed system is designed  
 To enhance the discriminability of face template by using Binary discriminant analysis. 
 To provide the better security to binary template against smart attacks and brute force 
attack. 
2. EXISTING TEMPLATE PROTECTION SCHEME 
Template Protection Scheme can be categorized into three main approaches: 1) the biometric 
cryptosystem approach 2) the transform-based approach and 3) hybrid approach. Figure 1 shows 
the categorization of template protection scheme. The basic idea of these approaches is that 
instead of storing the original template, the transformed/encrypted template which is intended to 
be more secure, is stored. In case the transformed/encrypted template is stolen or lost, it is 
computationally hard to reconstruct the original template and to determine the original raw 
biometric data simply from the transformed/encrypted template.  
In the biometric cryptosystem approach, the error-correcting coding techniques are employed to 
handle intra-class variations. Two popular techniques, namely fuzzy commitment scheme [7] 
and fuzzy vault scheme [8], are discussed. The advantage of this approach is that, since the 
output is an encrypted template, its security level is high. However, the error-correcting ability 
of these schemes may not be strong enough to handle large intra-class variations such as face 
images captured under different illuminations and poses. Also, this approach is not designed to 
be revocable. Finally, the error-correcting coding techniques require input in certain format 
(e.g., binary strings or integer vectors with limited range), and it is hard to represent every 
biometric template in this desired format. In the transform-based approach, a transformed 
template is generated using a "one-way" transform and the matching is performed in the 
transformed domain. The transform-based approach has a good cancelability (revocability) 
property, but the drawback of this approach is the trade-off between performance and security 
of the transformed template. The hybrid approach retains the advantages of both the transform- 
based approach and biometric cryptosystem approach, and overcomes the limitations of 
individual approaches [9] [10]. 
 
Figure 1. Categorization of template protection scheme 
Some of the existing biometric template protection schemes provide security to binary template 
and rest of the other enhances the discriminability of the template. The available biometric 
cryptosystem and transformed based template protection schemes are not yet sufficiently mature 
for large scale deployment; they do not meet the requirements of diversity, revocability, security 
and high recognition performance. So in order to take the benefits of both approaches while 
eliminating their limitations, a hybrid approach for face biometric was developed only for the 
verification process but not for the new user enrollment process. 
This limitation imposed to develop a new system to generate secure and discriminant face 
template for new user enrollment process as well as for the verification system. 
3. ARCHITECTURE OF PROPOSED SYSTEM  
A Novel Technique to generate discriminant and secure binary face template by using binary 
discriminating analysis is proposed. In this novel technique DP transform section from hybrid 
approach will replace by binary discriminant analysis. It is expected that this will enhance the 
discriminability of binary template. Finally, encryption algorithm is applied to generate secure 
template using fuzzy commitment. Figure 2 shows architecture flow of proposed system. Two 
stages (enrollment and authentication) of proposed system follow some steps which are 
explained in following section. 
 
Figure 2. Architecture flow of proposed system 
3.1. Random projection 
Random projection is a popular dimensionality reduction technique and has been successfully 
applied in many computer vision and pattern recognition applications. Recently, it has also been 
employed as a cancelable transform for face biometric [9] [10]. The main purpose of the 
original random projection is to project a set of vectors into a lower dimensional subspace while 
preserving the Euclidean distances between vectors before and after the transformation, with a 
certain probability. The idea was first developed by Johnson and Lindenstrauss. 
It will preserve the structure of the data without introducing significant distortion. It will 
represent faces in a random, low dimensional subspace. It uses random projection matrices to 
project data into low dimensional spaces. The matrix will be calculated using the following 
steps. 
Step 1: Set each entry of the matrix to an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) value. 
Step 2: Apply Gram-Schmidt algorithm to orthogonalize the rows of the matrix. 
Step 3: To preserve the similarities in the low dimensional space normalize the rows of the 
matrix to unit length. 
3.2. Binary discriminant analysis 
BDA algorithm requires minimized within class variance and maximized between class 
variance. Perceptron method is used to find the optimal linear discriminant function. In the 
training phase, genuine label for each class is required by the perceptron method. The 
perceptron minimizes the distance between binary templates to the corresponding target binary 
template. This binary template is used as the reference for each class. This method is only used 
for minimization of within-class variance not for the between-class variance. To maximize the 
discriminability of the template between-class variance should be maximized. 
But direct maximizing is difficult in binary space and conflicts with minimizing process of 
within-class variance. If the transformed binary templates in the same class are close to each 
other and binary templates of different class are far away then by using this new method it is 
possible to maximize discriminability of the binary template. The perceptron is used to find the 
optimal LDFs so that the output binary templates are closed to corresponding target binary 
template. Therefore within-class variance of binary template is minimized. Now, to maximize 
the between-class variance of the transform binary templates, target binary templates are 
randomly choose from the codeword of BCH codes having length, dimension with minimum 
distance. BCH codeword is randomly selected as the reference binary templates. 
3.3. Fuzzy commitment 
Fuzzy commitment scheme is applied on binary face template to provide the better security. 
Encryption algorithm is applied to encrypt the binary template and store binary template into 
database or to match with stored template. 
4. RESULTS 
This section discusses the results related discriminability and accuracy, computation time and 
security analysis for the hybrid approach and novel approach. 
4.1. Discriminability and accuracy 
Hybrid approach and novel approach generate there different face templates, namely cancelable 
template, binary template and secure template. In this section we evaluated the discriminability 
of each template in terms of the genuine and imposter histograms. 
 
Figure 3. Histogram of cancelable template 
 Figure 4. Histogram of binary template 
In Particular, we illustrate that the cancelable template discriminability is enhanced in the binary 
template and matching score of the templates at each stage of hybrid and novel approach. Table 
number 1 and 2 shows the matching score of templates at each stage in hybrid as well as novel 
approach respectively. Figure 3 and 4 show histogram of cancelable template and binary 
template for imposter and genuine user. Matching score of feature vector is greater than 
cancelable template score that means the accuracy and discriminability is degraded in random 
projection stage. The degraded accuracy and discriminability is enhanced by the binary template 
generated using DP transform. Figure 5 shows the graphical representation of this result. 
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Figure 5. Matching score for hybrid approach 
Matching score of feature vector (from Table 2) is greater than cancelable template score that 
means the accuracy and discriminability is degraded in random projection stage. The degraded 
accuracy and discriminability is enhanced by the binary template generated using binary 
discriminant analysis. Figure 6 shows the graphical representation of this result. 
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Figure 6. Matching Score for Novel Approach 
Table 1 Matching score of five images for hybrid approach 
Images Feature Vector Cancelable 
Template 
Binary Template 
Using DP Transform 
Hybrid 
Algorithm 
Image1 184 180 222 198 
Image2 187 178 218 196 
Image3 183 175 225 195 
Image4 189 174 215 201 
Image5 195 182 205 210 
Table 2 Matching score of five images for a novel approach 
Images Feature Vector Cancelable 
Template 
Binary Template 
Using BDA 
Novel 
Algorithm 
Image1 184 182 226 193 
Image2 187 170 220 197 
Image3 183 168 219 195 
Image4 189 174 221 203 
Image5 195 182 214 202 
Table 3 Matching score for five images for DP transform and binary discriminant analysis 
Images Binary Template 
Using DP Transform 
Binary Template 
Using BDA 
Image1 222 226 
Image2 218 220 
Image3 225 219 
Image4 215 221 
Image5 205 214 
 
The table no. 3 shows the matching score for five images for DP transform and binary 
discriminant analysis. The comparison of both the stages shows matching score for templates 
generated by binary discriminant analysis is greater than DP transform. This matching score is 
up to 80%. Figure 7 shows the graphical representation of this result. 
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Figure 7. Comparison of matching score for novel approach and hybrid approach 
4.2. Computation time 
All the experiments are performed on typical personal computer having configuration as core i5 
processor and both algorithms (hybrid and novel approach) are implemented using NetBeans 
IDE. Table no 4 and 5 shows the computation time for one class training process and the time 
for one input query template respectively. This time includes random projection, DP Transform 
and fuzzy commitment for hybrid approach as well for novel approach that includes random 
projection, BDA process and fuzzy commitment. Here we considered 10 sample images from 
standard database FERET, FRGC database and other data sets. Analysis of computation time of 
enrollment and verification stage is shown in Figure 8 and 9 respectively. 
Table 4 Computation time for verification process for ten images (time in seconds) 
Data Set For Hybrid Approach For Novel Approach 
FERET 348 335 
FRGC 366 370 
CMUPIE 342 340 
OTHER 372.6 365 
Table 5 Computation time for verification process for single image (time in seconds) 
Data Set For Hybrid Approach For Novel Approach 
FERET 44 48 
FRGC 40 39 
CMUPIE 41 43 
OTHER 43 43 
Computation Time for enrollment stage of Hybrid and Novel Approach
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Figure 8. Analysis of computation time of enrollment stage 
Computation Time for verification query for single image in Hybrid and Novel 
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Figure 9. Analysis of computation time of verification stage 
4.3. Security analysis 
This section analyzes the security strength of the hybrid approach, a novel approach at each 
stage of these algorithms. Two types of potential attacks, namely brute force and "smart" attacks 
are considered. Brute force attack tries to guess the biometric data without any information, 
such as matching score, to attack the system. The smart attack viz. affine transformation attack 
is considered. It can be seen that the security strength of random projection and DP transform 
are low and medium respectively in smart attack, but full hybrid algorithm is secure against this 
attack. 
In case of novel approach, it can be observed that the security strength of random projection and 
BDA process are low and medium respectively, but complete novel algorithm is highly secure. 
Hybrid approach and a novel approach are highly secure against brute force attack. In this case 
attacker requires number of trial of all possible combination of all alphanumerical character set. 
Here we have assumed character set of length 40 (including alphabets, numerical characters and 
other special characters). The attacker may try to guess the templates of each step. 
4.3.1. Random projection 
In hybrid algorithm, T1 is template generated at random projection step having length Kc (Kc is 
3772). Therefore, it will cost the attacker 2
kc-1
 operations to guess it. So this step is secure 
against brute force attack. 
4.3.2. DP transform 
In this step, T2 is template generated at DP Transform having Kc distinguishing points and 
there are totally 2
kc 
combinations. Therefore, it will cost the attacker 2
kc 
combinations to guess 
it. With known distinguishing points it is hard to implement brute force attack against this step. 
So this step is secured against brute force attack. For the affine transformation attack, the real 
valued template is very hard to be reconstructed from a binary template. Moreover matching 
score, distinguishing points are not useful in this attack. Therefore, the DP transform is secured 
against an affine transformation attack. 
4.3.3. Binary discriminant analysis 
In this step, T2 is template generated at BDA having Kc length and there are totally 2
kc-1
 
combinations. Therefore, it will cost the attacker 2
kc-1
 combinations to guess it. So this step is 
secure against brute force attack. 
For the affine transformation attack, the real valued template is very had to be reconstructed 
from a binary template. Moreover matching score is not useful in this attack. Therefore, the 
BDA process is very secure against an affine transformation attack. 
4.3.4. Fuzzy commitment scheme 
B1 is template generated in this step having length Kc (Kc is 11340). Therefore, it will cost the 
attacker 2
kc-1
 operations to guess it. So this step is highly secured against brute force attack. 
Fuzzy Commitment Scheme performs matching operation between two hashed data. Because of 
property of the hash function, the distance between these two hash data will not reveal distance 
information. Therefore matching score is useless for affine transformation attack. Therefore, the 
Fuzzy Commitment Scheme is secured against an affine transformation attack. 
4.3.5. Full algorithm 
Since the three steps are integrated together to form hybrid algorithm, the attacker cannot get the 
output from these steps. Thus this algorithm does not reveal any information to attackers. In this 
algorithm, we have encrypted binary template which cannot be easily accessible to the attackers. 
The output of each step is combined into one string in specific sequence is arranged. After this, 
the resultant string is converted into bytes which reduce the string length to store into database. 
Finally, this converted template is stored or matched with stored database template. Recovery of 
this stored template from brute force attack requires 2
kc-1
 (Kc is 6810) operations. Therefore, 
binary template recovery is not possible using affine transformation attack. So this full 
algorithm has high security strength against both attacks. 
As the three steps are integrated together to form novel algorithm, the attacker cannot get the 
output from these steps. Thus this algorithm does not reveal any information to attackers. In this 
algorithm, we have encrypted binary template which cannot be easily accessible to the attackers. 
The output of each step is combined into one string in specific sequence is arranged. After this, 
this string is converted into bytes which reduce the string length to store into database. Finally, 
this converted template is stored or matched with stored database template. Recovery of this 
stored template from brute force attack requires 2
kc-1 
(Kc is 6800) operations.  
Table 6 Security strength of the hybrid algorithm as well as each step in the full algorithm 
Attack Random 
Projection 
DP 
transform 
Fuzzy 
Commitment 
Full 
Algorithm 
Brute Force High High High High 
Affine 
Transformation 
Low High High High 
Table 7 Security strength of the novel algorithm as well as each step in the full algorithm 
Attack Random 
Projection 
BDA Fuzzy 
Commitment 
Full 
Algorithm 
Brute Force High High High High 
Affine 
Transformation 
Low High High High 
Therefore, binary template recovery is not possible using affine transformation attack. So this 
full algorithm has high security strength against both attacks. Table no. 6 and 7 show the 
security strength of hybrid algorithm and a novel approach at each stage. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
A novel approach using BDA was designed, implemented and rigorously tested on the standard 
benchmark FERET, FRGC and CMU PIE database. Before developing this novel approach, 
hybrid approach was also tested on the similar database. The results of both the methods viz. 
novel approach and hybrid approach are compared in terms of discriminabilty and security. The 
proposed novel technique enhances the discriminability and recognition accuracy by 80% in 
terms of matching score of the face images and provides high security. This clearly indicates the 
performance improvement in novel approach against hybrid approach. 
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